Armand Mauss has designated four categories of Mormon doctrine as “an operational construct [and] not a theological one”, which was “derived from empirical induction, rather than from anything formal.” Mauss’ structure proves to be extremely useful in evaluating and judging the authenticity of Mormon doctrine and observing how these various doctrines find place within not just the Church’s theological framework, but also the cultural underpinnings which are highly influenced by doctrinal notions. Mauss’ categories include, canon doctrine, official doctrine (and policy), authoritative doctrine, and popular doctrine. These categories represent a “scale of authenticity” and are helpful in assigning, or at least approximating the priority of LDS doctrinal conceptions.
Mauss identifies canon doctrine as both “doctrines and policy statements which the prophets represent to the Church as having been received by direct revelation, and which are subsequently accepted as such by the sustaining vote of the membership.” The KJV Bible, Book of Mormon, Doctrine and Covenants, and Pearl of Great Price “obviously fall into this highest category of authenticity.”
Official doctrine is described as “nearly as important” as canon doctrine, and includes “statements from the president or from the First Presidency, whether to priesthood leaders or to the world as a whole…church lesson manuals, magazines, [and/or] other publications appearing under the explicit auspices of the First Presidency.” Mauss is careful to explain that “General Conference addresses in their oral form should not routinely be included here, or if so, only tentatively, given the revisions that they have frequently undergone before being allowed to appear in print.” Further, “there is no assumption of infallibility here, but only that the legitimate spokesmen for the Church are expressing its official position at a given point in time.” It should also be pointed out that there is a marked difference between statements by members of the First Presidency and statements made by the First Presidency as a whole. The latter seem to carry much more weight.
Authoritative doctrine includes “all of the other talks, teachings and publication of authorities on Mormon doctrines and scriptures, whether or not these are published by a church press like Deseret Book.” These teachings and publications are presumed authoritative due to the “speaker’s high ecclesiastical office”, “formal scholarly credentials” (and I would add quasi-Church endorsement as in the case of a well-respected BYU professor), or “from both”. Mauss offers Bruce R. McConkie, Hugh Nibley, and James Talmage as examples of these “authoritative” sources respectfully.
The least authentic form of Mormon doctrine is popular doctrine which Mauss identifies as “folklore.” This doctrine often includes “apocryphal prophecies that often circulate around the Church” and other common beliefs that have either “local or general circulation.” Mauss notes that “occasionally a popular doctrine will be considered subversive enough by the General Authorities to warrant official condemnation, but usually folklore flourishes unimpeded by official notice.”
Clearly, “a particular doctrine can be found in all four categories simultaneously” and “such would ideally be the case for canon doctrine.” Thus Mauss’ “’authenticity scale’ may have a cumulative property in many cases” and in fact, “it is rare for a doctrine in a given category not to have some ‘following’ in the lower categories.” In evaluating authoritative LDS doctrine then, “it becomes crucial for us to determine… how high up the scale is the primary source of a given doctrine or policy.” In practice “this determination is rarely made, or even considered, by most Church members, who therefore remain very susceptible to folklore, as well as to doctrines that may be authoritative or even official, for a time, but later prove erroneous.”
Mauss’ doctrinal construct is extremely useful and allows us the attempt to categorize and prioritize the various and sometimes competing iterations of Mormon doctrine. However, this construct also has its limitations. For example, what Mauss considers canon doctrine is not always clearly understood and must be interpreted by the Church’s First Presidency in order to be put into practice. In these cases, it seems that official interpretation and policy perhaps do not take precedence over canon doctrine, but rather, are necessary corollaries used to interpret the meaning and intended purpose of the canon. Of course, this is not always the case and such official interpretations, as it were, are not appropriate (or necessary) when the canon appears to be very clear and definitive on a given subject. The canon indeed does have authority in itself which may trump official or authoritative interpretation. Thus the dynamic between canon doctrine and authoritative doctrine is complex and it is often difficult to define when official doctrine should accompany canon doctrine, and when the canon is sufficiently clear.
No where are this doctrinal construct and role of “official” authority more apparent than in the recounting of the LDS Church’s official history. History and doctrine are indelibly linked in Mormonism and from the beginning; the Church has had a keen interest in managing and controlling the presentation of its own past. Just as any religious tradition, Mormonism’s past has its difficult moments and the Church – especially the modern Church, have made great efforts to minimize the exposure of these “embarrassing” historical episodes. Church history then, also fits into Mauss’ doctrinal construct. There exists the “canon” history as presented in both the Doctrine and Covenants and Pearl of Great Price, the “official” which is taught in Church manuals, the authoritative which is found in forums such as BYU studies, and the “folk” which often time reflects both canon and official history. Unlike doctrine, which is very much a matter of belief, historical narratives can be verified and corroborated. Unfortunately, the official history of Mormonism does not always mesh with “real” history – at least it does not tell the whole story.
 Armand L. Mauss, “The Fading of the Pharoah’s Curse: The Decline and Fall of the Priesthood’s Ban against Blacks,” Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought 14, no. 3 (1981): 32.
 It is important to note that we are not discussing truth claims here, but rather LDS doctrine. It is true that many Latter-day Saints will view these as one and the same. However, as Mauss has illustrated here and elsewhere, and as mentioned above, LDS doctrine and policy can and does change depending on new and emerging circumstances.
 Mauss, “The Fading of the Pharoah’s Curse: The Decline and Fall of the Priesthood’s Ban against Blacks,” 32.
 It should be explained here that General Conference is a bi-annual meeting first instituted by Joseph Smith where the entire Church gathers to hear sermons and lectures from the Church’s general authorities. Today, this is facilitated through the use of the Church’s extensive satellite, radio, and television networks.
 Consider for example Jesus’ prohibition on divorce. In the New Testament this prohibition is unequivocal while in the Book of Mormon it is disallowed “except for fornication.” In the modern Church, divorce is highly discouraged, but allowed. Even couples who have been married and “sealed” in the LDS Temple can obtain a “cancelation” of their sealing under certain circumstances with direct approval from the First Presidency. Clearly, this is a canon doctrine which requires specific interpretation from Church leadership in order to establish a policy.
 While discussing this point with Richard Bushman, this author attempted to argue that it is the authority and present interpretation of the First Presidency which takes precedence over everything doctrinal – including the canon. Bushman countered that Latter-day Saints would readily reject, for example, a statement by the First Presidency that discouraged or prohibited prayer (see 2 Nephi 32:8), or denied the divinity of Jesus Christ (see John 1). He pointed out that while the First Presidency does possess tremendous power in doctrinal definition and interpretation of the canon, this power is in fact limited in many important respects.